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This report examines EU anti-dumpingpolicy with regard to its impact on users of goods that are subject to anti-dumping measures.In particular, this is done in light of the fact that the interest of industrial users has not once influenced the outcome of an anti-dumping proceeding (at least since 1998).
In recent years, the European Union's trade defence instruments (TDI) have increasingly been directed towards renewable energy sources, such as biodiesel, bioethanol, glass fibres, solar panels and solar glass. The TDI investigations on renewable energy sources affect import values which are among the highest of any of the EU's TDI measures. This provides an indication that there are considerable environmental values involved.
The most frequent reason for the use of anti-dumping measures is to counter "unfair competition" and to create "a level playing field" in the international trade. Aspects of competition are, however, not considered in anti-dumping investigations. Anti-dumping measures are mainly benefiting third country exporters not facing anti-dumping duties, more than the EU producers that have requested protection. In addition, the protection comes at a high cost. Each 1 euro gained by the protected EU industry implies an extra cost of 4.5 euro for importers, user industry and consumers in the EU.
The EU's interest as a whole, i.e. the 'Union interest test', must be taken into consideration before imposing TDI measures. The Union interest test is often highlighted by the Commission in WTO negotiations, as well as in various negotiations on free trade agreements as a 'WTO plus' requirement that goes beyond the WTO rules. However, the test is insufficient and does not cover all aspects of the Union's interest. In fact, real-world implications when assessing theUnion's interest are seldom mentioned. This needs to be improved in the modernisation review!
According to EU trade defence regulations, the European Commission should apply a lesser duty than the dumping/subsidy margin, if this is sufficient to remove the injury caused to the EU industry. In the modernisation review of the trade defence instruments (TDI), the Commission proposes to limit the use of the lesser duty rule. This brief explains the weaknesses of the Commission's proposal.
According to the EU anti-dumping regulation, the calculation of dumping for companies in a non-market economy should be based on values from an analogue country. In this brief, the National Board of Trade discusses some weaknesses with the current analogue country method, and suggests amendments on how the Regulation could be improved in order to address them.
Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures enter into force the day after they are publically announced. This makes it difficult for importers to plan their business activities, as months may pass between placing an order and customs clearance. This brief explains why the European Commission's proposal on the shipping clause, in certain ways, fails to solve the importers' situation and suggests how the proposal could be improved in order to address these weaknesses.
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